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Coin Flipping PUF: A Novel PUF with Improved
Resistance against Machine Learning Attacks
Yuki Tanaka, Student member, IEEE, Song Bian, Student member, IEEE,
Masayuki Hiromoto, Member, IEEE, and Takashi Sato, Member, IEEE
Abstract—We propose a novel coin-flipping physi-
cally unclonable function (CF-PUF) that significantly
improves the resistance against machine-learning at-
tacks. The proposed PUF utilizes the strong nonlin-
earity of the convergence time of bistable rings (BRs)
with respect to variations in the threshold voltage.
The response is generated based on the instantaneous
value of a ring oscillator at the convergence time of
the corresponding BR, which is running in parallel.
SPICE simulations show that the prediction accuracy
of support-vector machine (SVM) on the responses of
CF-PUF is around 50 percent, which means that SVM
cannot predict better than random guesses.
Index Terms—PUF, Hardware Security, Machine
Learning, Ring Oscillator, Bistable Ring.
I. Introduction
PHysically unclonable functions (PUFs) [1], [2] are at-tracting increasing attention in the field of hardware
security. PUFs utilize the inherent physical variations of
hardware components to generate chip-specific secret keys.
The PUF circuit serves as the function, r = fα(c), that
returns a response, r, upon receiving a challenge input c.
Depending on the physical variations in hardware, which
are represented by α, a unique and unclonable set of
challenge-response pairs (CRPs), (c, r), is determined for
each PUF chip. A variety of PUFs have been proposed
to ensure security, including the SRAM PUF [3], arbiter
PUF [1], ring-oscillator PUF (RO-PUF) [2], and bistable-
ring PUF (BR-PUF) [4].
The performance of the PUFs has traditionally been
evaluated using the metrics such as uniqueness and relia-
bility [5]. However, with the recent advances in machine
learning (ML), the ability of PUFs to resist ML attacks
has been scrutinized [6]–[8]. Generally, in an ML attack,
the attacker tries to characterize the entire CRP space by
observing the ML-based inference and conducting learning
on a small set of CRPs. A secure PUF needs to be immune
to such ML attacks.
It is known that some of the existing PUFs, such as
arbiter PUFs and BR-PUFs, can be modeled by simple
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Fig. 1. Circuit structure of a BR.
linear functions [6]–[8], which makes it trivial to predict
the PUF response by using ML algorithms. In a previous
study [8], support-vector machine (SVM) attacks were
used to predict the responses of BR-PUF and variants of
BR-PUF, with a success rate higher than 95%.
Here, our objective is to develop a novel PUF archi-
tecture that is resilient against ML attacks. We start by
analyzing the convergence time of BR circuits. Through
analytical formulations, the convergence time of a BR is
shown to be nonlinearly dependent on the variable source,
which is associated with the variation in the threshold
voltage of the transistors. Leveraging this nonlinearity, the
coin-flipping PUF (CF-PUF) is proposed, which includes
an RO and a BR, and its response is determined by the
instantaneous value of the RO at the exact time when the
BR paired to it converges. Extensive SPICE simulations
have shown that the proposed CF-PUF maintains an ideal
50% prediction accuracy against SVM attacks.
II. Preliminaries
A. Bistable Ring
A BR is a ring formed by an even number of inverters
with a circuit structure as shown in Fig. 1. It has two stable
states that are the clockwise enumerations of the inverter
outputs starting from inv1: “0101 · · · 01” (for which the
first four digits in hexadecimal notation correspond to “5”)
or “1010 · · · 10” (corresponding “A”). If an initial value
other than these two stable states is given, the BR starts
to oscillate until it reaches either of the two steady states.
Because the stable states are determined by the physical
variations of the transistors that compose the inverters,
BRs can be used to generate a chip-specific response.
Based on Fig. 2, we consider the convergence of the BR
in detail. When “0” is input to all inverters, as shown in
Fig. 2(a), all the inverters lie at the boundaries between
“5” and “A,” which are indicated by Bi in the figure. As a
signal propagates through the inverters, these boundaries
also propagate. During this period, the output of a specific
inverter becomes “0” and “1” repeatedly, meaning that
the BR is oscillating. Over time, the distance between
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Fig. 3. Circuit structure of a BR-PUF.
the boundaries diminishes because of the diﬀerence in the
propagation speed of each boundary caused by variations
in the inverter delays. As shown in Fig. 2(c), when one
boundary catches up to another, the number of boundaries
in the BR decreases. Eventually, the system reaches a
convergence state when none of the boundaries remain,
as shown in Fig. 2(b).
This observation indicates that the initial value given to
the BR is important to control the number of boundaries
and their positions. Diﬀerent initial conditions result in
diﬀerent oscillation times. If the initial value is as shown
in Fig. 2(b), the distance between the boundaries is max-
imized, and the oscillation time will be longer. In the
proposed circuit, this property is utilized to lengthen the
convergence time of the BR.
B. Bistable Ring PUF
In practical BR-PUFs, all the inverters are realized by
two dual-input NOR gates and a multiplexer (MUX) /
demultiplexer (DMUX) pair that selects one of the NOR
gates. The select signal is used as a challenge, and the
output of one of the MUXs is used as the response. Since
the delay of the NOR gate varies, diﬀerent BRs return
diﬀerent responses to the challenges. The other input pin
of each of the NOR gates is used for a reset signal and is
referred to as RESET. If RESET=1, the outputs of all the
NOR gates become 0 regardless of the input values. On
the other hand, if RESET=0, the BR-PUF operates as a
BR so the initial value for all the inverters is 0.
A response to a challenge is obtained by first setting
RESET=1 for initialization and then setting RESET=0. The



















(b) Signal propagation in the n-th inverter.
Fig. 4. Delay propagation of inverters in BR.
III. Convergence Property of a BR
A. Formulation of the Oscillation Behavior of a BR
Based on the drafting eﬀect [9], [10], the propagation
delay d of the inverter in Fig. 4(a) can be approximated as
a function of the time y elapsed after the last commutation
of its output:
d(y) = D − αe− yτ , (1)
where D is a linear function of the threshold voltage when
y is suﬃciently large, and α and τ are constants. Let Dp
and Dn denote the functions D in Eq. (1) when the output
of the inverter is rising and falling, respectively. The
changes in the delay of the inverter can be approximated
by a linear function of the variations in the threshold
voltage [11]. Therefore, Dp and Dn can also be expressed
as linear functions of the threshold voltages of the pMOS
and nMOS transistors, respectively.
Consider the case in which an initial value is given to
the 2N -stage BR as in Fig. 2(b). The input and output
waveforms of the n-th inverter, an and zn, respectively, are
shown in Fig. 4(b). In this figure, Tn,i (or T ′n,i) represents
the time from boundaries B1 to B2 (or from B2 to B1),
after the edge of B1 passes the n-th inverter i times.
From (1), Tn,i can be expressed based on the propagation
delays, d(yn,i) and d(y′n,i), as follows:
Tn+1,i = Tn,i + {dn(yn,i)− dn(y′n,i)}







where Dp,n and Dn,n denote Dp and Dn for the n-
th inverter, respectively. T ′n,i can be modeled using an
equation of the same form.
Thus, considering a1 as the response, RBR, the conver-
gence time can be calculated as TBR =
∑∞
i=1(T1,i + T ′1,i).
Since T1,i represents the time during which a1 remains
0, RBR becomes 1 as T1,i gradually becomes smaller and
finally attains a width of 0. Meanwhile, if T ′1,i becomes
smaller and converges to 0, then RBR becomes 0.
B. Validation of the Approximation Equations
Here, the discussion above is validated through SPICE
simulations using a commercial SPICE simulator [12] and
a commercial 65 nm process library. Ten thousand in-
stances of the 16-stage BR were generated while assuming
a Gaussian distribution for the threshold voltages.
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Fig. 5. Distribution of the relative errors in the convergence time
with and without the approximation.
First, Dp,n and Dn,n were calculated using the given
threshold voltage variations. Next, the relationship be-
tween D and the threshold voltage were obtained through
SPICE simulations, given the parameters such as α and
τ . Then, RBR and TBR were obtained using the equations
in Sec. III-A. To evaluate the impact of the exponential
term, RBR and TBR were also calculated using only the
linear component in Eq. (1), omitting the exponential
term, −αe− yτ . Finally, the calculated RBR and TBR were
compared with the results of the full SPICE simulation for
each instance.
The error rate for the estimation of the response, RBR,
was 1.66% and 1.65% when conducted with and without
the exponential term, respectively, which are low. Since D
is linear with respect to the threshold voltage variation,
RBR can be approximated by a linear equation.
The distribution of the relative errors of convergence
time, TBR, is shown in Fig. 5. The average and the maxi-
mum errors in the TBR estimation were 22.9% and 1650%,
respectively, when the exponential term was included;
these values were 161% and 167900%, respectively, when
the exponential term was disregarded, which are 7.01X
and 102X larger than those when the exponential term
was included. Thus, it is concluded that the exponential
term in Eq. (1), −αe− yτ , has a strong influence on the
estimation of the convergence time of the BR.
The above results indicate that the convergence value
can be accurately predicted by a linear function of the
threshold voltages; in contrast, the convergence time is
nonlinear with respect to the threshold voltage variation
and an exponential term must be used to calculate it.
Hence, we hypothesize that although PUFs utilizing the
convergence value are vulnerable to ML attacks, their
resistance to ML attacks can be greatly enhanced if the
convergence time is used for generating the response of
the PUF. Therefore, we propose a PUF that provides a
response based on the convergence time of a BR.
IV. Coin Flipping PUF
A. Circuit structure of CF-PUF
The proposed CF-PUF utilizes the oscillation time of a
BR to be more resistant to ML attacks. Fig. 6 shows the
structure of CF-PUF consisting of two ring circuits and
one flip-flop. One ring is a 2N -stage BR, and the other is











Fig. 6. Schematic of the proposed CF-PUF (N mod 2 = 1).
instantaneous response of the RO at the convergence time
of the BR is used as the response of CF-PUF. To lengthen
the convergence time of the BR, the two farthest inverters
at the Nth and the 2Nth stages are replaced with NAND
and NOR gates when N is an even number, or two NORs
when N is an odd number. The remaining inputs of the
NOR or NAND gate are used for the reset signal. The
D flip-flop captures the instantaneous value of the RO
at the last rising edge of the BR prior to convergence,
which becomes the response of CF-PUF. The name of the
proposed CF-PUF is derived from the way in which the
value of the RO, which is oscillating rapidly between 0 and
1, is captured by the BR as in a coin toss.
In CF-PUF, the BR and RO are interleaved with
switch blocks that are in between the stages that com-
prise two MUXs to propagate the signal, which is either
straight or crossed. Thus, the route selection of each
switch block becomes a challenge input of CF-PUF. The
total number of selection circuits is 2N . However, if
XNOR{C1, · · · , C2N−1} is given to the Nth switch block,
a single (4N + 1)-stage RO is formed instead of the two
separate loops in the BR and the RO. To avoid this con-
figuration, we assign the value of XOR{C1, · · · , C2N−1} to
the switch block at the 2Nth stage. Hence, the number of
eﬀective challenge bits for the CF-PUF becomes 2N − 1.
B. Nonlinearity of the Response
As discussed above, CF-PUF is designed to determine
a response based on the convergence time dominantly
according to a nonlinear function of the threshold voltage.
Let the oscillation period of the RO and the convergence
time of the BR be TRO and TBR, respectively. The response







The response contains two nonlinear components: TBR,
which is a nonlinear function of the threshold voltage, and
the modulo operation, which is a nonlinear function itself.
Thus, CF-PUF is considered resistant to ML attacks.
CF-PUF also possesses stronger immunity than RO-
PUF against side-channel attacks as CF-PUF contains a
BR structure [10]; RO-PUF is vulnerable against electro-
magnetic analysis for detecting the frequencies of the RO,
which can then be used to mathematically clone the PUF.
However, the frequency of the BR changes temporally as
the number of pulse edges changes, so the responses of
CF-PUF are diﬃcult to retrieve.
Possible side-channel attacks specific to CF-PUF in-
clude current measurement, which indirectly reveal the
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TABLE I
Uniqueness evaluations for BR-PUF and CF-PUF
H D U
16-bit BR-PUF 0.25 0.53 0.79
18-bit BR-PUF 0.26 0.54 0.87
17-bit CF-PUF 0.98 1.00 0.89
oscillation duration of the BR. However, the aforemen-
tioned nonlinear properties make it diﬃcult to model
the relationship between the challenge and the oscillation
duration. Though the results are omitted due to space lim-
itation, SPICE-based experiments that simulate attempts
to predict the TBR value using regression analyses were all
unsuccessful (the results are not shown here due to space
limitations).
V. Numerical Evaluation
The performances of the proposed 17-bit CF-PUF and
two conventional 16-/18-bit BR-PUFs (long and normal)
are evaluated using SPICE simulations. Since CF-PUF
and BR-PUF can only take odd and even numbers of chal-
lenges, respectively, the above 3 conditions with similar
numbers of challenge bits were selected to conduct a fair
comparison.
The commercial SPICE simulator and a 65 nm process
library and the same threshold voltage variation described
in the previous section were used. For each PUF, 12,000
CRPs obtained using random challenges were evaluated in
terms of 5 criteria: randomness, diﬀuseness, uniqueness,
resistance against ML attacks, and reliability. The sim-
ulation period was 1.0 × 10−7 s, within which all of the
BR-PUFs and all but one of CF-PUFs converged.
A. Randomness, Diﬀuseness, and Uniqueness
We first evaluate the performances of the PUFs in terms
of the following 3 metrics: randomness (H), diﬀuseness
(D), and uniqueness (U) [5]. Randomness represents the
similarity of the appearances of 0’s and 1’s in a PUF’s
response. Diﬀuseness represents whether a single PUF
returns diﬀerent responses to diﬀerent challenges, and
uniqueness represents whether diﬀerent PUFs return dif-
ferent responses for the same challenge. Each metric takes
a value between 0 and 1, where 0 is the worst and 1 is the
best. A total of 1000 CRPs were generated for 10 diﬀerent
PUF instances. The results shown in Table I indicate that
CF-PUF outperforms the BR-PUFs in terms of all 3 of
these metrics.
B. Resistance against Machine-Learning Attacks
The resistance against ML attacks is a characteristic
of a PUF representing the diﬃculty to predict its CRPs
using ML techniques. This characteristic was evaluated
in terms of the prediction accuracy by an SVM classifier
with a linear kernel implemented by a Python scikit-learn
library [13]. Two thousand CRPs were randomly selected
for testing, and ntrain CRPs were selected without overlap









(a) With linear kernel.

















(b) 17bit CF-PUF against vari-
ous kernels.
Fig. 7. Prediction accuracy by SVM attacks.
for training. The prediction accuracy was calculated with
diﬀerent ntrain values. The ideal prediction accuracy is
0.5, which indicates that the response is completely un-
predictable.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 7(a). In this
experiment, in addition to the BR-PUF and CF-PUF,
12,000 CRPs with convergence times that are longer than
2.5×10−8 s were also evaluated and referred to “long BR-
PUF.” In the 16-bit and 18-bit BR-PUFs, the prediction
accuracy was above 0.9, indicating that their responses are
generally predictable by the SVM after about 100 CRPs
are collected for training. The prediction accuracy in the
long BR-PUF was lower than that of the BR-PUF, but still
close to 0.9. On the other hand, the prediction accuracy in
CF-PUF remains constant at about 0.5 regardless of the
number of CRPs collected.
In addition, the prediction accuracy of CF-PUF by an
SVM classifier using a radial basis function (RBF) kernel,
a polynomial kernel, and a sigmoid kernel was tested.
As shown in Fig. 7(b), the prediction accuracy in CF-
PUF remained around 0.5, indicating that it is diﬃcult
to predict the response of CF-PUF by these various SVM-
based ML attacks even when more than 10,000 training
samples are used.
We also evaluated the resistance of the proposed PUF
against 4 ensemble ML techniques that are known to
be eﬀective attacks against PUFs: the evolution strategy
(ES) [14], random forest (RF) [15], bagging [16], and
boosting [17]. ES was implemented by Python with Py-
Brain [18], and the other classifiers were implemented with
scikit-learn [13]. The results of the first 2 attacks are shown
in Fig. 8; the results of the last 2 are omitted due to
space limitations, but the results were very similar to those
shown in Fig. 8. The results confirm that the proposed
CF-PUF was also resistant to ensemble ML methods.
Together, these results demonstrate that the proposed CF-
PUF has strong resistance against a wide variety of ML
attacks.
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Fig. 8. Prediction accuracy by ensemble ML techniques.
C. Reliability
Reliability is a characteristic whereby the same PUF
always returns the same response to the same challenge.
Here, the reliability of CF-PUF and various BR-PUFs was
evaluated as the temperature and the supply voltage were
varied. The PUFs were evaluated at measurement temper-
atures of 20◦C, 30◦C, 40◦C, and 50◦C, and the results were
compared to that at 25◦C as a reference. While the supply
voltage was varied from the nominal voltage of 1.2V by
−2%, +2%, −5%, and +5%. The results in Fig. 9 show
that BR-PUF is slightly better than CF-PUF and long
BR-PUFs under both temperature changes and variations
in the supply voltage. However, considering the results
shown in Sec. V-B, this reduced reliability of CF-PUF
compared to the BR-PUF (only down to 0.9) comes with
an improved resistance against ML attacks. Thus, under
appropriate voltage and temperature control, CF-PUF is
better than the BR-PUF.



















Fig. 9. Reproducibility under temperature and voltage changes.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel CF-PUF that utilizes
the convergence time of a BR such that the response of
the CF-PUF is generated based on a nonlinear function.
This feature makes it diﬃcult to predict the CRPs in an
ML attack using a linear classifier. Through the SPICE
simulations, it was shown that the use of ML techniques
to predict the responses of a CF-PUF was only about 0.5,
which means that it is highly unpredictable.
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